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A B S T R A C T
Although management scholars recognize that intention of formalization inﬂuences the manner in which formal
controls are applied within organizations, this issue has been largely overlooked in research on strategic alli-
ances including franchise networks. We investigate formalization intent (the way in which controls are initiated
and executed) by asking: How do franchisor formal controls promote trust and brand-supportive behavior among
franchisees? On the basis of case study research involving retail franchises, we develop a framework that ex-
plains how formal controls counter-intuitively promote franchisee brand-supportive behavior via trust-building.
Our study contributes to understanding the complementary relationship between formal and social control on
promoting partner trust and co-operation. These insights move research beyond the present preoccupation with
the complementary inﬂuence of formalization degree and content.
1. Introduction
The aim of many strategic alliances is to create value that otherwise
could not be produced by a single ﬁrm, by way of resource develop-
ment, learning, enhanced co-ordination, and innovation (Cao and Yan,
2018; Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ozdemir,
Kandemir, & Eng, 2017; Sydow, Schüßler, & Müller-Seitz, 2016; Zajac &
Olsen, 1993). However, potential alliance value creation can only be
realised through eﬀective governance (Madhok, 1995; Madhok &
Tallman, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Value creation is particularly
challenging for strategic alliances involving a joint production of ser-
vices. One such type of alliance is retail franchising, in which franchisor
managers support franchisees across the network to deliver services
that maintain the brand positioning (Nyadzayo, Matanda, & Ewing,
2015). Brand positioning comprises those attributes and values that
managers choose to be associated with the brand to represent the
franchise and its oﬀer to the market (Blomback & Ramirez-Pasillas,
2012). Without the joint contribution of franchisees and franchisor
managers to reinforce and enhance the brand positioning, the franchise
network would struggle to grow, or retain customers.
Franchising research suggests that eﬀective governance involves
formal and social controls (i.e. trust, shared values and norms) working
in complement to foster franchisee compliance with franchisor stan-
dards (Dickey, McKnight, & George, 2008; Herz, Hutzinger, Seferagic, &
Windsperger, 2016; King, Grace, & Weaven, 2013). Although much
research investigates how formal controls (franchise contract and
monitoring) minimize franchisee tendency towards behavior that de-
viates from franchisor standards (Kashyap, Antia, & Frazier, 2012;
Zhang, Lawrence, & Anderson, 2015), researchers also appreciate that
such governance occurs in the context of franchisee trust towards the
franchisor (Croonen & Brand, 2013; King et al., 2013; Nyadzayo et al.,
2015). This is consistent with scholarship of alliance and network
governance that appreciates the complementary inﬂuence of formal
and social control (Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 2005; Faems, Janssens,
Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008; Mellwight, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Sydow & Windeler, 2003). Trust, typically as-
sociated with social control, is considered beneﬁcial to exchange re-
lationships because it can foster co-operation and performance
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Lumineau, 2017; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
However, studies provide a deﬁcient understanding of how formal
controls promote trust that underpins co-operative partner behavior.
This is because of two main shortcomings in the extant research. First,
much current knowledge of the way in which formal control comple-
ments or even supports trust is based on conceptual arguments (Faems
et al., 2008; Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Poppo & Zenger,
2002). Although, some empirical research measures the complementary
relationship between discrete aspects of formal contracts and trust (Cao
& Lumineau, 2015; Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002),
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studies emphasize only certain dimensions of formalization. This for-
malization concerns “both… the process of codifying and enforcing in-
puts, outputs and behaviours (Ouchi, 1979), and… the outcomes of this
process, in the form of contracts, rules and procedures (Aiken and Hage,
1966)” (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006, p. 1618–1619). For-
malization includes the process of developing and executing formal
controls that regulate partner behavior. This has three main attributes,
namely: degree (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997; Reuer & Arinõ, 2007), con-
tent (Hagedoorn, Buunk, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Lou, 2002; Lou & Tan,
2003), and the intention behind the process (Adler & Borys, 1996;
Vlaar, 2006). In particular, this intention of formalization inﬂuences the
manner in which controls are initiated and executed, whether by im-
position or agreement (Vlaar, 2006). The main premise of this paper is
that formalization intent is a major condition explaining the com-
plementary relationship between formal and social control. But, the
issue of how formalization intent inﬂuences trust development and co-
operation has been largely overlooked in research on alliances and
network governance. Rather, in eﬀorts to explain alliance performance,
studies emphasize measuring associations between trust and formal
control in the forms of contract degree and content (Li et al., 2010;
Mellewigt et al., 2007; Mesquita & Brush, 2008; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
To address this deﬁciency, our study investigates formalization intent
within alliance governance by asking: How do franchisor formal controls
promote trust and brand-supportive behavior among franchisees?
In their inﬂuential conceptual work, organizational theorists Adler
and Borys (1996) propose two types of formalization intent: coercive
and enabling controls (Vlaar, 2006). Whereas coercive controls enforce
reluctant compliance among disengaged organizational members, en-
abling controls develop and leverage a user's skills, capabilities, and
intelligence (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan & Messner, 2012). We argue
these formalization intents are central to alliance and network gov-
ernance and therefore will aﬀect how partners work. Further, these
intents can shape the interactive relationship of formal and social
control. For example, when formal controls are designed and exercised
in a way to provide user ﬂexibility, and to support skill development,
partner trust should increase (cf. Arinõ & de la Torre, 1998; Faems
et al., 2008).
Based upon a multiple case study research methodology involving
retail franchises, our study develops a framework that explains how
formal controls promote brand-supportive behavior of franchisees via
trust-building. Towards this end, our study uses theories from social
psychology (including expectancy and social comparison theories) to
explain how such controls operate to inﬂuence trust and co-operation.
First, expectancy theory posits an individual exerts eﬀort when they
have a positive expectancy about the link between certain activities and
desired outcomes (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999).
Manager discussions about goals and activities that contribute to them
can develop a positive expectancy, which motivates brand-supportive
behavior (Neider, 1980; Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998). Second, social com-
parison theory suggests that dissemination of cross-unit performance
monitoring data develops a positive expectancy and intention to use
this information to shape compliant franchisee behavior (Christy & Fox,
2014; Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011). According to Kidwell and Nygaard
(2011), cross-unit performance monitoring information prompts fran-
chisees to compare themselves to those with better performance, which
motivates them to minimize deviant behavior, and may encourage
brand-supportive behavior.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background
to theories and concepts that eventually informed our data collection
and analysis. In Section 3 we describe the case study methodology we
employed to collect and analyze data. Section 4 presents the model that
emerged from our data. Following this, in Section 5 we describe our
contributions and implications for research.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Social control and trust processes
Researchers appreciate the complementary inﬂuence of formal and
social control on promoting partner co-operation (Faems et al., 2008; Li
et al., 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Sydow & Windeler, 2003). Social
control incorporates informal bases for regulating behavior (Aulakh,
Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; Das & Teng, 2001; Inkpen & Curral, 2004); it
includes shared beliefs, norms, values, and trust. In particular, re-
searchers emphasize the complementary inﬂuence of trust (Inkpen &
Curral, 2004; Li et al., 2010). Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer
(1998) adopt a multidisciplinary view and deﬁne trust in terms of “a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of an-
other” (p. 395). This deﬁnition incorporates two common components
of trust. The ﬁrst is a positive “expectancy” about the intentions and
behavior of another party, which may be an individual or organization
(Ganesan & Hess, 1997; Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 2000). The second,
“behavioral” component, concerns the intention to rely on the exchange
partner in acceptance of the vulnerable circumstance (Singh &
Sirdeshmukh, 2000). Given that behavioral intention is usually the
outcome of an attitude, the expectancy component precedes the beha-
vioral one in the development of trust (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).
Trust can be based on aﬀect and cognition (McAllister, 1995). Af-
fect-based trust consists of emotional ties between individuals. How-
ever, cognitive-based trust consists of expectations not only regarding
benevolence but also competence (Sako, 1992; Singh & Sirdeshmukh,
2000). These expectations may concern technically and organization-
ally competent role performance, but also genuine concern about the
partners' welfare (Barber, 1983; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Ex-
pectations about benevolence and competence are likely to develop
over time as franchisors demonstrate role performance in delivering
support services, such as marketing, training, and business development
(Nyadzayo et al., 2015).
Trust can help to align franchisor and franchisee interests (Davies,
Lassar, Manolis, Prince, & Winsor, 2011) and facilitate co-operation
through information sharing, joint problem solving, and the delegation
of decision rights to franchisees (Herz et al., 2016; Mumdžiev &
Windsperger, 2013). Expectancy theory may explain how trust develops
and promotes brand-supportive behavior among franchisees (Behling &
Starke, 1973; Vroom, 1964). According to this theory, expectancy is the
strength of a person's momentary belief that certain behavior will lead
to a desired outcome (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy can range from a
value of zero (no relationship between action and outcome) to one
(complete certainty that acting in a particular way will lead to the
outcome - Behling & Starke, 1973; Vroom, 1964). When a person has a
positive expectancy about an action-outcome link, (s)he will exert eﬀort
to adopt consistent lines of behavior (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge &
Schlacter, 1999). However, when a person has zero expectancy, (s)he
will not exert eﬀort to adopt the action that (s)he believes has no re-
lationship with a desired outcome (Behling & Starke, 1973; Mitchell,
1974). Factors that may develop expectancies include personal ex-
periences in similar situations (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999), and discus-
sions about how to achieve desired work outcomes (Neider, 1980;
Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998). Franchisor manager discussions may inﬂuence
franchisee business goals and beliefs that recommended brand-sup-
portive activities will help to achieve them, particularly when fran-
chisees have conﬁdence in their business development support com-
petence. This positive expectancy likely underpins franchisee
motivation and intention to adopt the recommended activities.
2.1.1. Formal control, formalization intent, trust building and co-operative
behavior
Although several studies ﬁnd support for a complementary re-
lationship between formal control and trust, our current understanding
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is largely limited to the degree and content of formalization, especially
through the use of formal contracts. However, formal control in most
alliances involves a range of formal control procedures, including
contracts (Das & Teng, 2001). More importantly, these formal control
procedures are often designed with an underlying purpose or intent as
to the desired inﬂuence on partner behavior (Adler & Borys, 1996). For
example, research emphasizes how many formal controls are designed
to strictly regulate franchisees against deviance from franchisor stan-
dards (Kashyap et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015). On the other hand,
controls may be designed to oﬀer franchisees regular feedback, support,
and ﬂexibility (King et al., 2013; Nyadzayo et al., 2015). Either way,
this intent can be considered a central design element which funda-
mentally determines how formal control operates within the alliance,
and will aﬀect its relationship with trust. Our central argument in this
paper is that formalization intent can partly explain how formal control
promotes trust and co-operation within alliances. Within franchise
networks, this co-operation may range from compliance to proactive
brand-supportive behavior.
Researchers investigate two complementary dimensions of for-
malization intent that foster consistency with desired standards: coer-
cive and enabling controls (Free, 2007; Jordan & Messner, 2012;
Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). According to Adler and Borys (1996),
coercive controls “are designed to force reluctant compliance and to
extract recalcitrant eﬀort” among disengaged controlees, who acquiesce
with the controller's speciﬁed standards (p. 69; cf. Stansbury & Barry,
2007). Conceptual research suggests that coercive controls include
certain performance monitoring processes that develop a threat of
punishment (Adler & Borys, 1996; Stansbury & Barry, 2007). Such
monitoring alerts a controller to insubordination. Managers typically
monitor alliance partners against speciﬁed performance outcomes (such
as proﬁt, market share, customer satisfaction - Dekker, 2004; Groot &
Merchant, 2000). To encourage eﬀort to foster these outcomes, alliance
contracts include penalties, such as contract termination (Reuer &
Arinõ, 2007; Ryall & Sampson, 2009). By adopting recommended
procedures to avoid contract termination, franchisees may develop a
positive expectancy about such activities. Given this expectancy, fran-
chisees are likely to exert work eﬀort to adopt recommended proce-
dures to maintain business compliance.
The second type of formalization intent proposed by Adler and
Borys (1996) are enabling controls. The enabling controls develop and
leverage a user's skills, capabilities, and intelligence (Adler & Borys,
1996; Jordan & Messner, 2012). In doing so, enabling controls can
promote employee trust and commitment to do their jobs eﬀectively
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Hoy & Sweetland, 2001; Stansbury & Barry,
2007). Enabling controls often provide users with an understanding of
local work processes (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom,
2008). An essential aspect of franchisor formal controls is the in-
formation system that franchisors utilize to (collect and) disseminate
performance monitoring information (Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011; King
et al., 2013). According to Mellewigt et al. (2007); monitoring proce-
dures speciﬁed in contracts require partners to record their eﬀorts and
associated outcomes. This is likely to allow franchisors to establish a
record of accomplishment in technical competence that informs fran-
chisee experiences, and develops trust towards certain types of re-
commended activities.
Further, enabling controls can provide employees with intelligibility
of the overall control system in which they are working (Adler & Borys,
1996; Jordan & Messner, 2012). System information that fosters this
intelligibility includes communications about strategy (Ahrens &
Chapman, 2004; Jordan & Messner, 2012) and cross-unit performance
monitoring (Free, 2007). Social comparison theory may explain how
dissemination of such performance monitoring information promotes
trust and brand-supportive behavior (Festinger, 1954; Kidwell &
Nygaard, 2011). According to this theory, people are driven to self-
evaluate and compare their abilities to similar others, to reduce un-
certainty (Christy & Fox, 2014; Festinger, 1954). Further, when
individuals compare themselves to others that have demonstrated
better performance, this negatively inﬂuences their self-evaluation, and
can motivate them to improve it (Argo, White, & Dahl, 2006; Wheeler,
1966). The theoretical work of Kidwell and Nygaard (2011) suggests
that cross-unit performance monitoring information prompts fran-
chisees to compare their abilities to those of better-performing unit
operators, which motivates them to avoid deviant behavior. Accord-
ingly, we posit that dissemination of cross-unit performance monitoring
information develops franchisee positive expectancy about using this
information and motivates competitive brand-supportive behavior.
In summary, research provides limited insight into how formal
controls operate to promote partner trust and co-operation. We antici-
pate that formalization intent, alongside expectancy and social com-
parison theories, will help explain how formal control promotes trust
and brand-supportive behavior in franchise networks. Next we present
details of the case study methodology we employed to investigate how
formal controls inﬂuence franchisee brand-supportive behavior.
3. Method
We adopted a multiple case study research design for two main
reasons. First, case study research allows scholars to build and elaborate
theories of complex social processes within business-to-business set-
tings (Andersen & Kragh, 2010; Bizzi & Langley, 2012; Borghini, Carù,
& Cova, 2010). Second, case studies allow researchers to develop a
context-sensitive theory based on real-world observations of a phe-
nomenon (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki,
2011). We adopted a multiple case study research design, which pro-
vides the opportunity to replicate relationships and produce a robust
theory, based on real-world observations that are cross-checked across
cases and integrated with theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Our
study adopted a theory-building and -elaboration approach, which al-
lowed us to develop a theoretical framework that explains how fran-
chisor formal controls promote franchisee trust and brand-supportive
behavior.
We used purposive sampling, to select ﬁve cases based on a pre-
conceived set of dimensions (Silverman, 2010). This included the fol-
lowing criteria:
1. To minimize external variation beyond the phenomenon of interest
and allow the comparison of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989), we conducted
all our investigations in a single country, industry, and type of retail
franchise. All ﬁve cases (BatteryPower, HealthyPools, Mend-it,
24–7, and SuperCharge) were from the Australian consumer retail
industry (see Table 1 for further case characteristics). Operating in a
developed Western country, the Australian retail industry has es-
tablished sophisticated retail practices. Retailers within this industry
are known for being pioneers of innovation (Kimmorley, 2017). This
suggests the possibility of franchises having sophisticated formal
controls that inﬂuence franchisee brand-supportive behavior. After
all, franchisees are charged with responsibility for implementing
franchisor innovations that deliver value to customers.
2. All franchises were of a rather mature nature, with over 10 years of
experience managing franchisees. These were attractive for this
study because they are likely to have well-established formal con-
trols inﬂuencing franchisees to act in a brand-supportive way.
3. All retail franchises selected were successful. They had won, or been
nominated for franchise industry awards in Australia. The awards
recognized proﬁtable franchises with consistent branding, and
supportive franchisees. We reasoned that proﬁtable franchises are
likely to have consistent service delivery that meets customer ex-
pectations and promotes (re)patronage. This consistency is partly
attributed to franchisor formal controls that inﬂuence service stan-
dards.
Within these criteria, we selected cases that varied in the extent to
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which franchisees had positive expectations about franchisor technical
competence. In phase one of the data collection period (2013–2014) we
found that 24–7, Mend-it, and HealthyPools had relatively stable
franchisor manager support teams (comprising key functional managers
with at least four years tenure with the franchise) so franchisees gen-
erally had positive expectations about franchisor technical competence
(i.e. trust). However, in the phase two data collection period
(2015–2016) the BatteryPower and SuperCharge marketing managers
we initially spoke with described struggling to encourage some fran-
chisees to adopt recommended brand-supportive activities.
BatteryPower and SuperCharge had appointed new franchisor man-
agers to oversee key support functions (including marketing and op-
erations) within the year of recruiting the franchises. The new man-
agers were externally recruited. We reasoned that there was likely
greater potential for BatteryPower and SuperCharge franchisees to de-
velop negative expectations about franchisor technical competence,
given that managers had a limited time to demonstrate their knowledge
and expertise. Such negative expectations might explain why some
franchisees were unwilling to adopt franchisor recommendations.
3.1. Data collection
Data collection spanned over the period of November 2013 to May
2016. Our primary source of data was semi-structured interviews. We
collected data in a retrospective way by asking informants to describe
events within the year of each interview. To minimize retrospective bias
and to develop converging lines of inquiry, we used data source trian-
gulation within each case. This included multiple informant perspec-
tives, archival data, artifacts, and responses to follow-up email ques-
tions (Yin, 2009).
Alliance researchers have long argued that data from both sides of
the relational dyad enhances validity and increases reliability
(Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Ness, 2009). As such, we conducted in-
terviews with franchisees and franchisor managers, which included the
perspectives of both controllers (franchisor managers) and controlees
(franchisees) from within each case. To promote variation within each
case in the degree of brand-supportive behavior among franchisees, we
asked franchisor managers to invite franchisees that could be described
as either: highly-supportive, moderately-supportive, or had a low-level
of support for branding goals. The selected franchisees oﬀered a variety
of perspectives on how formal controls inﬂuenced their behavior.
In total, we conducted 30 interviews (see Appendix A for a summary
of the informants and manager role titles). This included between ﬁve
to seven interviews within each case. The interviews lasted between 12
and 177min. Each interview was transcribed verbatim, producing be-
tween 6 and 102 pages of text. We adhered to the “24 hour” rule for
writing interview summaries that guided data collection and analysis
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Ellis & Pecotich, 2001). Our detailed
notes summarized themes and further questions and data needed to
develop them.
To build good rapport with participants, many of the interviews
were conducted at the workplace of informants (which included head
oﬃces and retail outlets in Sydney and Queensland, Australia).
However, some of the interviews were conducted remotely using Skype.
To minimize the potential for respondent bias, we explained to in-
formants that pseudonyms would be used to protect the identity of
informants and the franchise (i.e. coded names are used for all franchise
brands shown in Table 1).
To develop converging lines of inquiry, the interviews with fran-
chisor managers and franchisees covered similar topics. The interview
guide included questions on: business performance outputs of fran-
chised businesses, the brand vision, the franchise's marketing program
and recent changes to it, and franchisor controls (such as goal setting
and planning, the franchise contract, performance monitoring, in-
formation sharing practices, and formalized meetings). Although we
used an interview guide, we adopted a conversational style and used
probing questions to develop a detailed understanding of the formal
controls.
We collected archival data in the form of audit reports, conﬁdential
documents, website information and online articles to triangulate data
on formal controls, and develop explanations about factors that inﬂu-
enced them. This data triangulation helped to develop an appreciation
of contextual factors needed to understand the operation of certain
control procedures. For example, we used website information to better
understand how franchisees employed audit report recommendations to
direct their employees.
We collected follow-up email question responses to triangulate data on
formal controls. After analyzing each interview transcript, the lead
author sent 26 follow-up emails to franchisees and franchisor managers,
asking questions about: performance monitoring information dis-
semination, compliance monitoring, franchisee awards, goal setting and
planning, and formalized meetings. The email question responses
helped to clarify details of formal controls, such as compliance mon-
itoring, performance monitoring, dissemination of performance data,
and goal setting and planning.
Artifacts included electronic images of data displayed on the online
portal interface located within franchised stores. This allowed the re-
searchers to appreciate the nature and inﬂuence of certain performance
monitoring information on franchisee behavior. For example, a theme
that emerged was the use of sophisticated information system data. We
made a point to collect data about these information systems. The lead
author asked to look at the front screen interface of the 24–7 online
portal during one store visit and took a photo of it. After observing this
portal interface, the researcher asked speciﬁc questions about the per-
formance monitoring information displayed, and how the franchisee
used it.
3.2. Data analysis
Following well-established multiple case study methods, we started
analyzing data by writing case summaries for each franchise of the
formal controls and their inﬂuence on franchisees (Hallen & Eisenhardt,
Table 1
Characteristics of the cases.
Retail franchise Retail sector Years with franchise
operations in Australia
Number of franchised
stores
Number of company
owned storesa
Number of full-time employees
with franchisor
BatteryPower Batteries and related products 17 80 6 12
HealthyPools Pool and spa maintenance products
and services
19 70 0 30
Mend-it Shoe repairs, key cutting, engraving,
and watch repairs
11 165 71 22
SuperCharge Salads and healthy snack food 11 101 7 32
24–7 Service station and convenience
stores
35 620 1 310
a This means that all but one case make use of the “plural form,” which includes franchisee-owned and franchisor-owned retail units (Bradach, 1997).
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2012). The second author, who is an expert in research on inter-orga-
nizational relationships, reviewed each case summary and suggested
exploratory lines of inquiry. We did not have in place a ﬁrm set of
hypotheses, but we initially wanted to develop a greater understanding
of how retail franchises foster brand-supportive behavior among fran-
chisees.
After discussing the case summaries, it became apparent that the
informants were telling their stories about how formal controls inﬂu-
enced franchisee trust and behavior supporting branding goals. We
eventually decided to investigate the research question: How do formal
controls promote brand-supportive behavior among franchisees? We
returned to the interview data to develop themes about the processes by
which formal controls operate to inﬂuence franchisee behavior.
In keeping with our case study theory-building approach, our ca-
tegories and their deﬁnitions emerged from our interview data. We
labelled our ﬁrst-order categories using informant words that captured
the meaning of controls, or terms that described them (see Table 2, data
structure). Next, we compared our ﬁrst-order categories with extant
literature to collapse them into second-order categories. We compared
our emerging theoretical framework with extant literature to develop
theoretical categories and reﬁne the understanding of formalization
intent processes (Eisenhardt, 1989). This included comparisons to ex-
pectancy theory, social comparison theory, and formalization intent.
In accordance with Miles and Huberman (1994), who suggest that
coding reliability can be checked using a variety of methods, we
adopted the following: The ﬁrst two co-authors met regularly to discuss
the emergent theoretical framework and interrogate the coding scheme.
We interrogated the deﬁnition of codes and considered them with re-
spect to the data evidenced across sources (including interviews and
artifacts). We went back and forth between the data and the literature
to develop explanations, until theoretical saturation was reached and
we were conﬁdent there was a close match between the theory and the
data. The resulting theoretical framework explains how franchisor
formal controls promote franchisee trust and brand-supportive beha-
vior.
To enhance study reliability, we provide a chain of evidence to show
how our framework was developed (Yin, 2014). This is addressed partly
by the data structure that shows how our data analysis progressed from
the development of ﬁrst-order and second-order categories, to the re-
sultant theoretical categories (Table 2). Theoretical categories for the
formal controls were corroborated by at least three quotes across
franchisees and franchisor managers within each case. Examples of
quotes for each theoretical category are provided in Tables 3 to 5. Next
we present the ﬁndings, which link interview, archival, and artifact
data with our theoretical categories.
4. Findings
Our ﬁndings will demonstrate how formalization intent, with its
coercive and enabling features, operates to promote franchisee trust
and brand-supportive behavior within the retail franchises. Three sys-
tems of formal controls (compliance-promoting-procedures, marketing-
trust-building-procedures, and social-comparison-activating-proce-
dures) promoted franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior when
franchisees had positive expectations about the franchisor technical
competence and benevolence. Such positive expectations were the
foundation for trust and co-operation within the franchise network
(Sako, 1992; Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 1998).
4.1. Compliance-promoting-procedures and trust
Franchisees were obliged to maintain compliant businesses that
adhered to franchisor brand standards for service delivery and the vi-
sual identity. Compliance-promoting-procedures developed franchisee
positive expectancy and motivation to adopt franchisor-recommenda-
tions for procedures to improve business standards. These procedures
comprised: compliance monitoring, remedial action, rewards, and the
threat of punishment (see Table 3 example quotes). In many cases,
compliance-promoting-procedures started with coercive monitoring that
drew franchisor attention to non-compliant businesses. This included
franchised stores that achieved below the business audit benchmark
score, which for 24–7 was 90 out of 100.
4.1.1. Enabling compliance-promoting-procedures
Remedial action was one enabling dimension of compliance-pro-
moting-procedures (all cases except HealthyPools). Business audit
scores that fell below the performance benchmark alerted ﬁeld man-
agers to execute remedial action, which developed franchisee under-
standing of recommendations to improve business compliance. Field
managers made such recommendations in the form of in-store meeting
discussions and audit reports. Shortly after each audit, managers gave
franchisees a report that documented their recommendations for im-
proving store standards. Franchisees used audit reports as a tool to
guide actions to improve business compliance.
The second enabling dimension of compliance-promoting-proce-
dures was rewards. Franchisor rewards for achieving business audit
benchmark goals encouraged franchisee motivation to adopt re-
commended procedures to maintain business compliance (24–7). For
example, some 24–7 franchisees exerted eﬀort to maintain business
compliance, so they could be rewarded with ﬁeld manager support.
Franchisees with experience of performing below the 24–7 audit
benchmark scores understood that if they complied with the brand
standards, they could receive greater goal support. Field managers
provided goal support to compliant franchisees, which involved helping
them to develop short-term plans for marketing activities that would
improve business performance. Franchisees appreciating the contribu-
tion of goal support were motivated to improve business compliance.
4.1.2. Coercive compliance-promoting-procedures
Coercive aspects of compliance-promoting-procedures developed a
threat of punishment (Adler & Borys, 1996; Stansbury & Barry, 2007),
which encouraged franchisees to attend to information about re-
commended procedures to improve business compliance. Some fran-
chisees concerned about losing the franchise licence were motivated to
maintain business compliance (Mend-it, HealthyPools). This perceived
threat occurred when franchisor manager assessments of business
compliance governed practices of franchise agreement renewal and
termination. Mend-it franchisees were aware that only franchisees with
stores that achieved above the 65% benchmark score for store audits
were entitled to renew their franchise agreement. Franchisees subjected
to remedial action were reminded of this franchise agreement renewal
requirement. These franchisees were conscious of the need to uphold
business compliance, to avoid losing their franchise licence.
HealthyPools franchisees became more motivated to maintain
business compliance after learning about franchisor managers termi-
nating some franchise agreements. In 2012 managers orchestrated or-
ganizational renewal by forcing non-compliant franchisees to leave the
franchise. According to the Chief Operations Oﬃcer, the remaining
franchisees that heard about the franchise agreement termination of
neighbouring stores in Sydney began to “toe the line a little bit more”
and maintain business compliance.
4.1.3. Summary: compliance-promoting-procedures and trust
Expectancy theory explains how compliance-promoting-procedures
encourage trust and brand-supportive behavior (Behling & Starke,
1973; Neider, 1980). The enabling aspect of remedial action builds trust
by positively inﬂuencing franchisee expectancy and intention to adopt
recommended procedures to replicate the brand standards. Remedial
action provides information that develops franchisee understanding of
rewards and recommended procedures for improving business com-
pliance (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008).
Coercive procedures that develop a threat of punishment (losing the
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franchise licence) inﬂuence franchisees to attend to such re-
commendations, which promotes a positive expectancy about actions to
replicate the brand standards (Neider, 1980). Given this positive ex-
pectancy, franchisees exert eﬀort to adopt brand-supportive behavior to
improve business compliance (Behling & Starke, 1973; Mitchell, 1974).
The desired outcomes that underpin this motivation include receiving
rewards (greater goal support) and avoiding franchise contract termi-
nation.
Proposition 1. Enabling and coercive compliance-promoting-
procedures encourage brand-supportive behavior because they
develop franchisee trust towards recommended actions to improve
business compliance.
4.2. Marketing-trust-building-procedures and trust
The enabling marketing-trust-building-procedures provided system
information that developed a positive expectancy about franchisor-re-
commended marketing activities. That is, system information (about
suitable business goals, marketing activities, and performance mon-
itoring data) shaped franchisee beliefs that recommended marketing
activities contribute to business goals. Given this positive expectancy,
franchisees exerted eﬀort to adopt such marketing activities. Table 4
provides quotes illustrating marketing-trust-building-procedures, which
comprised: goal setting and planning, goal support and monitoring, and
manager communications.
4.2.1. Goal setting and planning
The foundation for a positive expectancy about recommended
marketing activities was brand-supportive business goals. Goal setting
and planning procedures inﬂuenced franchisees to develop business
goals and a positive expectancy about marketing activities that would
help to achieve them. Formalized planning processes, such as setting
templates, scheduled discussions, and benchmark goals, provided in-
formation that enabled franchisees to develop business plans aligned
with the brand vision (all cases).
Managers utilized information system data to recommend bench-
mark goals, which franchisees often adopted (all cases except
SuperCharge). Franchisees understood that managers set benchmark
goals based upon analysis of the previous years' cross-unit business
performance, which gave them conﬁdence that their goals were
achievable. HealthyPools Franchisee A explained that the manager-re-
commended performance benchmarks were sometimes set higher than
those she had initially planned for her business.
4.2.2. Goal support and monitoring
Goal support procedures developed franchisee appreciation of
marketing activities that could help to reduce the gap between business
Table 3
Compliance-promoting-procedures.
Franchise Examples
BatteryPower Compliance monitoring: The business development review is a full audit on this store, on OH and S, WH and S… cleanliness, presentation product, mystery shopper
results, it measures everything. (Franchise Development Manager)
HealthyPools Threat of punishment:… when you do use your franchise agreement it does a couple of things. It says to the rest of the group, hang on, the franchisor's serious so if
I'm not meeting my obligations I too could be on the end of a breach and being asked to leave and losing my hard earned investment in this business. (Chief
Operations Oﬃcer)
Mend-it Threat of punishment: The bottom line is you follow the procedures and policies of the company… and any breach of it means that you're contravening an
agreement…. If you're not following the rules, well then…. when you come for your renewal, they're, obviously, going to say well look, you had your opportunity
but you didn't do this and you didn't do this and you didn't do this. Therefore, there's no renewal. (Franchisee B)
24–7 Rewards: So in the… three hour meetings I'd have with this franchisee 80% would be about coaching and getting that store compliant to performance - making it,
helping it improve rather than business building. So if they can't be compliant in brand standards… you probably won't move onto business building activities
until they've got the basics right. (District Manager)
SuperCharge Remedial action: [Have you used some of the audit report feedback recently?] Yes I have… I've used it to pick up…my staﬀ. They weren't using Daydots when they
were cutting things up. Daydots are so that you can actually show the lifecycle of something. That was picked up and I hadn't noticed they weren't doing it on
certain products so from a food safety and a quality issue that was good. (Franchisee B)
Table 4
Marketing-trust-building-procedures.
Franchise Examples
BatteryPower Goal setting and planning: There's a review of the business plan that is originally presented for a new franchise and feedback is… provided… the idea is… to make
sure that… it meets benchmarks so there's individual internal benchmarks of staﬃng, what you plan to spend… operating expenses, etc., so if these ﬁgures don't
look you know in alignment to our benchmarks across the country questions would be asked to work with that franchisee to ensure that… they are representing
their business truly. (Network Development Manager)
HealthyPools Goal setting and planning:We do projections and they see that we have these set benchmarks that we have to meet to make sure that our business is going forward,
growing even bigger and therefore theirs is too… [who sets the benchmarks?] HealthyPools sets that. They always ask… our optimism I suppose and what we
think we can do and then they say… on a national level if the whole HealthyPools was growing up at 6% and we are only thinking about two then we would have
to rethink that and maybe look at why we can't do the 6%. (Franchisee A)
Manager communications:… We show them the process and how simple it was and we did some test emails to people in the room live during the event and they
got to see from being onscreen to being on someone's phone how quick and easy that actually was. Then started building up some case studies based on some good
results that we had seen from some earlier adopters and so demonstrated their return-on-investment. (Franchise Operations Manager)
Mend-it Goal setting and planning: Our business plan - a template is sent out from Mend-it… we need to ﬁll out that template and have our business strategy in there… by
[the] end of March every year…. They'll submit it to your Regional Manager… and if there's any gap or anything that he may ﬁnd, he'll come back to us and say,
look, I've noticed you've put this into your business plan. How are you going to do it? Elaborate on it a little bit more. When are you going to have it done by?
(Franchisee A)
24–7 Goal monitoring: … for example 24–7 day today, we have so many sales, what is our goal, try to serve how many customers, and which sale, which store they're
doing particularly good, and look after customer in a very expert and they've got a high volume, people turn up to the site. They [franchisor managers]…
manually communicate [by email and newsletters]… [to] let other people know how's my neighbour or how's other shops, the performance. (Franchisee C)
SuperCharge Goal monitoring: … we were the number one store in the State for the highest sales for the cold pressed juice…. that data is available as a generic email…. that
basically… talk about store one with the percentage and store two and store three and their performance. [And how did that make you feel?]…. it gives you that
feeling that the brand is on the right track with the introduction of a new product, that it is well received by the consumers and the improvement to your bottom
line by putting that extra eﬀort in. (Franchisee D)
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goals and actual performance (all cases). This involved routine meet-
ings during which ﬁeld managers discussed with franchisees their
progress towards achieving business goals. For example, SuperCharge
Franchise Operations Manager, Ted, inﬂuenced Franchisee Z “that
didn't believe in marketing their business” to introduce and develop
“one of the fastest growing loyalty card databases… in the country”
(Franchise Operations Manager). Ted made it easy for the franchisee to
adopt his recommendation by proposing short-term goals for the loyalty
program launch, and by coaching his employees on behavior to pro-
mote it.
Performance monitoring information developed franchisee appre-
ciation that certain marketing activities had contributed to business
goals. Franchisors disseminated this performance monitoring informa-
tion, alongside the implementation of marketing activities, in the form
of weekly or monthly emails, newsletters, meeting discussions, and
performance ﬁgures displayed on portal screens (all cases, see Appendix
B photograph). For example, SuperCharge Franchisee D explained how
an email report developed his appreciation that campaigns like the cold
press juice launch contributed to proﬁt goals. The email reported on
cross-unit percentage sales increases during the cold press juice launch
campaign period.
4.2.3. Manager communications
Certain manager communications developed a positive expectancy
with the franchisees that a recommended marketing innovation would
contribute to business goals (all cases). These manager communications
provided information about implementation procedures and the value
of the innovation. For example, HealthyPools managers presented a
“simple” process to implement digital marketing communications and
explained how the innovation would provide a return-on-investment.
Given their new appreciation of the value of digital marketing com-
munications and the accessible implementation process, many
HealthyPools franchisees had since adopted them within their busi-
nesses.
4.2.4. Summary: marketing-trust-building-procedures and trust
Expectancy theory explains how the enabling marketing-trust-
building-procedures (goal setting and planning, goal support and
monitoring, manager communications) promote trust and brand-sup-
portive behavior. This trust includes a positive expectancy and beha-
vioral intention to adopt franchisor recommended marketing activities.
Goal setting and planning procedures lay the foundation for developing
this expectancy by encouraging franchisees to adopt brand-supportive
goals. Manager discussions encourage franchisees to develop desired
outcomes in the form of business goals aligned with the brand vision
(Neider, 1980). Franchisees develop conﬁdence to adopt benchmark
business goals, especially when they appreciate that franchisor analysis
of cross-unit business performance trends underpin them. Subsequent
procedures provide information (marketing recommendations and
within-unit and cross-unit performance monitoring), which shapes a
positive expectancy that recommended marketing activities contribute
to business goals (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999).
Given this positive expectancy, franchisees are motivated to exert eﬀort
to adopt brand-supportive behavior that includes recommended mar-
keting activities (Behling & Starke, 1973; Mitchell, 1974). Franchisees
develop a positive expectancy that recommended marketing activities
will help to achieve business goals based on their interpretation of past
experiences and discussions with franchisor managers (Fudge &
Schlacter, 1999; Neider, 1980; Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998).
Proposition 2. Enabling marketing-trust-building-procedures
encourage brand-supportive behavior because they develop franchisee
trust towards recommended marketing activities.
4.3. Social-comparison-activating-procedures and trust
Social-comparison-activating-procedures promoted trust and brand-
supportive behavior by inﬂuencing franchisees to develop a positive
expectancy and intention to use cross-unit branding performance
monitoring information. Franchisors disseminated cross-unit perfor-
mance monitoring information (about sales outputs and business stan-
dards, see Appendix C), which encouraged franchisees to make social
comparisons that motivated competitive brand-supportive behavior (all
cases). Table 5 provides quotes illustrating the enabling social-com-
parison-activating-procedures, which developed franchisee under-
standing of branding performance abilities across units. For example,
the main goal for HealthyPools was to become the fastest growing and
most recognized spa and pool maintenance service provider in Aus-
tralia. In accordance with this goal, managers commended franchisees
that had achieved the highest sales for mobile and shop businesses and
“top 10 total sales” at (monthly and annual) award ceremonies (Fran-
chise Operations Manager). This information encouraged franchisees to
compare their ability to achieve high sales outputs with that of the
award winners, which motivated them to improve performance in this
area. According to Franchisee A, information about the HealthyPools
awards fostered competitive behavior to “… get on with beating the guy
next door. It is that sort of mentality” (Franchisee A).
Although franchisees with successful businesses were receptive to
cross-unit branding performance monitoring information, franchisees
with poorly performing businesses paid little attention to it. This was
the case for some SuperCharge franchisees that thought that award
information commending branding performance achievements of the
top performing stores (in business standards and sales outputs) was not
relevant to them. For example, Franchisee A explained that: “… our
performance like [for] two years… it's really bad so….I am not paying
attention to the awards.”
Table 5
Social-comparison-activating-procedures.
Franchise Examples
BatteryPower I am the worst in the country for mystery shopper [audit]…. So yeah so that's one area that I'm number 78 out of 90 so that's deﬁnitely an area that I need to work
on. (Franchisee B)
HealthyPools [… why do you think that the franchisee awards are important?] It creates a little bit of a goal for people that are new and starting out or haven't been doing so
well. It is made a fairly big deal of with prizes and so forth for winning those awards, but people you know look at it and say it would be nice to be able to do that.
It just adds a bit of motivation I am pretty sure. (Franchisee B)
Mend-it Ted… he's been [the number one performer in audit scores]… for a while, the guy in Victoria now has outdone him he just wants to outdo him again this year. So
it just drives that kind of competition so it's all, that's all great but really who beneﬁts by that, it's really the customer because they get the better service because
they're focused on the results of the customer. (National Human Resource Manager/National Franchise Manager)
24–7 I think they're [franchisee awards are] important because… they set standards and benchmarks as well…. so I think it's good for setting that base and that
standard. It's good… as an engagement tool… for example the Franchisee of the Year this year is actually in my district, so is one of my franchisees… all of my
stores are talking about the fact that he won. So there's that kind of buzz in the air. So it's motivating others who were moderately performing to perform better.
(District Manager)
SuperCharge The State managers… put somebody up for who they think is the best performing store in an area or had the greatest change around in sales…. You know
somebody who they feel has achieved something for the brand. (Franchisee B)
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In summary, enabling social-comparison-activating-procedures
promote brand-supportive behavior by inﬂuencing franchisees to de-
velop a positive expectancy and intention to use cross-unit branding
performance monitoring information (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan &
Messner, 2012). Social comparison theory explains how these enabling
procedures operate to inﬂuence franchisee trust and co-operation
(Christy & Fox, 2014; Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011). When franchisors
disseminate cross-unit performance monitoring information (about
sales outputs and business standards), this prompts franchisees to
compare themselves to better performing network operators, which in
turn motivates brand-supportive behavior (Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011).
This motivation is underpinned by franchisee appreciation of a simi-
larity in their branding abilities with better performing unit operators
(Christy & Fox, 2014; Festinger, 1954). However, when franchisees
perceive that they do not have similar branding abilities to better
performing unit operators, they disregard cross-unit performance
monitoring information. This situation applies to franchisees that have
poorly performing businesses.
Proposition 3. Enabling social-comparison-activating-procedures
develop franchisee trust to use cross-unit performance monitoring
information, which enhances brand-supportive behavior.
5. Discussion
Our study makes two main contributions to research on the com-
plementary relationship between formal and social control within
strategic alliances in general, and franchise networks in particular. It
moves this research beyond the present emphasis on the degree and
content of formalization. Instead, we examined how formalization in-
tent shapes franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior. Grounded
in the work of organizational theorists (Adler & Borys, 1996; Stansbury
& Barry, 2007) as well as in expectancy (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge
& Schlacter, 1999) and social comparison theories (Argo et al., 2006;
Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011), our data demonstrate that coercive and
enabling features of controls shape the way in which trust promotes
partner co-operation in general, and in particular, brand-supportive
behavior that is crucial for franchise networks. Our key contribution is
to draw attention to this overlooked dimension of formalization intent,
which permits a deeper understanding of the complementary relation-
ship between formal and social control. This includes appreciation of
how complex multi-dimensional control systems operate to inﬂuence
trust and co-operation in alliances and networks.
Our data demonstrate that when franchisees have positive evalua-
tions of franchisor technical competence and benevolence three systems
of formal controls promote trust and brand-supportive behavior (com-
pliance-promoting-procedures, marketing-trust-building-procedures,
and social-comparison-activating-procedures - see Fig. 1 and
Propositions 1, 2, 3). This applies to the cognitive dimension of trust,
which includes a positive expectancy and behavioral intentions to use
cross-unit performance monitoring information, and franchisor re-
commended activities for marketing and improving business com-
pliance.
We show that some formal controls have enabling as well as coer-
cive dimensions, both functioning in complimentary ways to promote
franchisee trust, and brand-supportive behavior. For example, coercive
compliance-promoting-procedures that develop a threat of punishment
(losing the franchise agreement) encourage franchisees to attend to
enabling dimensions of remedial action. This includes manager re-
commendations that develop a positive expectancy and intention to
adopt procedures to improve business compliance. As a result, fran-
chisees adopt brand-supportive behavior to enhance uniformity in
franchisor standards across the retail network.
Our second key contribution is to demonstrate how theories from
social psychology can explain the relationship between formal control,
trust and co-operation. Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggest the need for
theoretical perspectives from social psychology to better explain how
controls inﬂuence partner behavior, to extend the then dominant
transaction cost economic theory perspective. In support, our frame-
work demonstrates that social psychology theory is useful for devel-
oping explanations about how formal controls operate to promote trust
and co-operation in strategic alliances and, in particular, in franchise
networks. This includes the exposition of cognitive dimensions of trust
processes. This diﬀers from cross-sectional studies that measure the
complementary relationship between discrete aspects of formal control
and trust in explaining performance within strategic alliances (Cao &
Lumineau, 2015; Li et al., 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Our study
instead builds on theoretical work that suggests the expectancy di-
mension of trust precedes the behavioral one (Morgan & Hunt, 1994;
Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 1998). Our data demonstrate how expectancy
and social comparison theories provide an understanding of trust pro-
cesses, which include past experiences and formal controls that are
antecedents to a positive expectancy (about using cross-unit perfor-
mance monitoring information and franchisor recommended activities).
This positive expectancy inﬂuences a behavioral intention that includes
motivation to adopt brand-supportive behavior to; improve self-eva-
luation, achieve business goals, or avoid franchise contract termination.
As such, our study addresses recent calls for research to develop the so
far limited understanding of “cognitive micro-foundations” within al-
liance governance (Lumineau, 2017, p. 1571).
6. Conclusion
Our study extends prior research on the complementary relationship
between formal and social control by investigating how formalization
intent promotes trust and brand-supportive behavior within franchise
networks. Rather than measure associations between discrete aspects of
formal control and trust, we adopted a case study methodology invol-
ving ﬁve retail franchises to capture how formalization intent works to
shape trust processes and brand-supportive behavior. As such, our study
moves beyond the present preoccupation with formalization degree and
content (i.e. in the form of formal contracts).
Considering the qualitative nature of this research, generalizations
must be made with care. Our study is based on a small sample of
Australian retail franchises potentially limiting the implications of the
research to a particular sector and national context. One key issue is
whether our theoretical insights are transferrable to other retail fran-
chise networks. Our sample comprised mature Australian retail fran-
chises that have managed franchisees for 10 or more years and that had
won or been nominated for industry awards recognizing best practice.
As the data may be biased towards franchise networks in mature and
stable markets with more sophisticated formal controls, future studies
might explore the interplay of formal and social controls and the role of
formalization intent within less mature retail franchises. This might
include franchisors with very limited experience in managing fran-
chisees that have only few formal controls in place. This research could
investigate processes to develop formal controls within relatively new
retail franchises that have fewer than three years of experience in
managing franchisees. As developing eﬃcient formal controls takes
time, this research should adopt a longitudinal design.
Our study does not detail the speciﬁc dimensions of trust (i.e.
competence, benevolence) that formal controls enhance (as this was not
a study aim). Investigations of how formal controls inﬂuence compe-
tence and benevolence trust may deepen our understanding of eﬀective
formalization intent processes. For instance, we might expect that
certain enabling controls may enhance the competence and bene-
volence dimensions.
In other strategic alliances and networks (c.f. Sydow et al., 2016),
we might expect other complementary relationships between formal
and social control in inﬂuencing partner co-operation, but most likely a
similar role of formalization intent. Accordingly, we would encourage
researchers to investigate the complementary relationship between
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formal and social control on promoting partner co-operation in other
types of alliance or network governance. We anticipate that in-
vestigating formalization intent within other types of alliances and
networks will shed new insights on this complementary relationship.
While our research demonstrates a relationship between formal
control and trust when franchisees have positive expectations about
franchisor technical competence and benevolence, our study explores
few additional contextual inﬂuences. Yet we expect powerful organi-
zational conditions are facilitating and constraining the application of
coercive and enabling formal controls. For example, factors such as
professional training and organizational socialization might aﬀect ﬁeld
manager motivation and ability to apply these controls. Field managers
may learn the application of formal controls through diﬀerent means,
such as direct experience and organizational training. We anticipate
that a practice-based approach (that attends to socially embedded and
recurrent activities that provide meaning and order) may produce new
insights into other contextual factors that inﬂuence the relationships
between formal control, trust, and co-operation (Berthod, Grothe-
Hammer, & Sydow, 2017). Such a study might involve ethnography to
examine the process of learning and executing formal controls and the
inﬂuence on franchisee behavior in day-to-day practice.
Finally, our data is speciﬁc to domestic alliances, and therefore our
ﬁndings might be challenged in an international context. It is logical to
expect national culture and institutional conditions aﬀect the choice
and eﬃcacy of formal controls, and related interaction with social
controls. For example, coercive controls might be less popular or viable
in countries where managers are less goal orientated or where there are
poor levels of contract enforceability. As a result, alliance managers in
general and franchise managers in particular may rely heavily on en-
abling controls from the outset. With this in mind, future studies, taking
a formalization intent perspective could examine how institutions in-
ﬂuence the way formal and social control interact to promote partner
co-operation.
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Appendix A. Informant role titles
Franchise Role title Number of interviews
BatteryPower Network Development Manager 1
Franchise Development Manager 1
Franchisee A 1
Franchisee B 1
Franchisee C 1
Franchisee D 1
HealthyPools Chief Operations Oﬃcer 2
Franchise Operations Manager 1
Franchisee A 2
Franchisee B 1
Fig. 1. Formal control inﬂuence on franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior.
* e = enabling features, c = coercive features.
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Mend-it National Marketing Manager for Australia 1
National Human Resource Manager/National Franchise Manager 1
Regional Manager for Victoria 1
Franchisee A 1
Franchisee B 2
Franchisee C 1
24–7 District Manager 1
Senior Franchise Development Manager 1
Franchisee A 1
Franchisee B 1
Franchisee C 1
SuperCharge Franchise Operations Manager 1
National Marketing Manager 1
Franchisee A 1
Franchisee B 1
Franchisee C 1
Franchisee D 1
Appendix B. Photograph of business output information shown on 24–7 online portal front screen
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Appendix C. Photograph of award information displayed on 24–7 online portal front screen
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